In this paper, we present an epistemic logic approach to the compositionality of several privacy-related informationhiding/disclosure properties. The properties considered here are anonymity, privacy, onymity, and identity. Our initial observation reveals that anonymity and privacy are not necessarily sequentially compositional; this means that even though a system comprising several sequential phases satisfies a certain unlinkability property in each phase, the entire system does not always enjoy a desired unlinkability property. We show that the compositionality can be guaranteed provided that the phases of the system satisfy what we call the independence assumptions. More specifically, we develop a series of theoretical case studies of what assumptions are sufficient to guarantee the sequential compositionality of various degrees of anonymity, privacy, onymity, and/or identity properties. Similar results for parallel composition are also discussed.
INTRODUCTION
An information system generally consists of a number of subsystems. If some subsystems are shown to have certain formal properties and some others shown to have different properties, the question arises as to how we can deduce that the total system has certain formal properties. Or, more complicatedly, the system may possibly consist of a variety of subsystems that have various degrees of multiple properties. Thus, the concept of compositionality plays a key role in a modular approach to formal reasoning about complex information systems.
This paper deals with a logical approach to the compositionality of several privacy-related informationhiding/disclosure properties. Since privacy and related properties such as those discussed in [21, 2] have become crucial requirements for today's information systems, the compositionality of those properties has also become a concern. The properties considered here are anonymity, privacy, onymity, and identity ( Fig. 1) . Intuitively, we can understand anonymity to be the property of hiding who performed a certain specific action, privacy that of hiding what was performed by a certain specific agent, onymity that of disclosing who performed a certain specific action, and identity that of disclosing what was performed by a certain specific agent. A series of previous studies by Halpern and O'Neill [12] , Mano et al. [19] , and Tsukada et al. [26] showed that these properties can be formulated concisely in terms of epistemic logic (or the modal logic of knowledge) for multiagent systems.
For example, sender anonymity can be formulated in terms of our epistemic logic as
Here, IA, called an anonymity set, denotes a set of possible senders. We read this formula as "if an agent i sends a message m, then the observer j thinks that it is possible that every agent i in IA performs the sending action." In other words, this formula means that the observer j does not know who sends the message m. On the other hand, message privacy can be formulated as
Here, AI , called a privacy set, denotes a set of possible sending actions, that is, {send (m ) | m is a possible message}. This formula should be read as "if an agent i sends a mes-(to hide who performed)
(to hide what was performed)
anonymity ←"dual"→ privacy ↑ ↑ "contrary" "contrary" ↓ ↓ onymity ←"dual"→ identity ( to disclose who performed)
(to disclose what was performed)
Figure 1: Privacy-related information-hiding/disclosure properties.
sage m, then the observer j thinks that it is possible that the agent i performs every sending action a in AI ." In other words, this formula means that the observer j does not know what message is sent from the agent i. We may say that these two properties-sender anonymity and message privacy-are "dual" because each of the above two formulas can be obtained from the other by interchanging "who" with "what," or more specifically, I A with AI . We can also define onymity and identity as the "contrary" of anonymity and privacy, respectively, in terms of epistemic logic. Thus, epistemic logic enables us to succinctly describe formal specifications of various privacy-related information-hiding/disclosure properties of information systems. In this paper, the epistemic logic approach developed in [12, 19, 26] is further exploited to discuss the compositionality of multiple properties comprising anonymity, privacy, onymity, and identity. More specifically, the contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows. First, we indicate that anonymity and privacy are not necessarily sequentially compositional. (This may be contrary to our intuition, because we might think that anonymity/privacy can be reinforced by sequentially connecting anonymous/private communication channels.) To show this indication, we introduce, as a motivating example, an abstract model of an anonymous members-only bulletin board system, which comprises two sequential phases, namely, the registration and posting phases. We show that the composition of anonymity in the registration phase and privacy in the posting phase does not necessarily induce anonymity or privacy in the entire system. If we regard anonymity and privacy as special cases of unlinkability, this indication can be paraphrased by saying that even though a system comprising several sequential phases satisfies a certain unlinkability property in each phase, the system as a whole does not always enjoy a desired unlinkability property. For example, our epistemic logic approach shows that a chain M 1 * M2 of two mix-servers [5] does not necessarily guarantee unlinkability between incoming and outgoing messages even though both M 1 and M2 do. This non-compositionality of unlinkability can be viewed as being analogous to the non-transitivity of inequality: a = b and b = c do not necessarily imply a = c. Second, we show that the sequential compositionality of anonymity and privacy can be guaranteed provided that the phases of the system satisfy what we call the independence assumptions. We develop a series of case studies of what assumptions are sufficient to guarantee the sequential compositionality of various degrees of anonymity, privacy, onymity, and/or identity properties. These compositionality results are summarized in Table 1 . Third, we show that similar compositionality results can be obtained for parallel composition. We demonstrate that some variations of independence assumptions also play important roles in guaranteeing the parallel compositionality of anonymity and privacy.
Related Work
A considerable amount of substantial research on the measurement, characterization, and taxonomy of privacy and related information-hiding/disclosure properties has been undertaken from various standpoints [7, 23, 8, 25, 14, 17, 21, 30] . The present paper focuses on formal approaches to privacy-related properties, since our primary motivation is to contribute to the development of a new methodology for the formal verification of these properties.
Formal approaches to privacy-related information-hiding properties go back to the seminal work of Schneider and Sidiropoulos [22] , who formulated the concept of strong anonymity in terms of a process calculus called CSP. Since then, this concept has been further developed and elaborated in various computational or logical frameworks such as ACP [20] , applied π calculus [6] , I/O-automata [16] , category theory [13] , and epistemic logic [24, 27, 10, 15, 29, 1, 28, 18, 4, 3] .
Although the approach presented in this paper shares a common style of anonymity definitions with these epistemic logic approaches, it directly builds on the approach described by Halpern and O'Neill [12] . Within Halpern and O'Neill's framework, Mano et al. [19] formulated privacy as the dual of anonymity and showed that these two properties can be related by a newly proposed information-hiding property called role interchangeability. They proved the roleinterchangeability property of a practical electronic voting protocol, thereby demonstrating the voter anonymity and vote privacy properties of the protocol. Further, Tsukada et al. [26] considered the logical contraries of anonymity and privacy, thereby giving formal definitions of onymity and identity. In particular, they showed that some weak forms of anonymity and privacy are compatible with some weak forms of onymity and identity, respectively. They also discussed the relationships between their proposed definitions and existing standard terminology, in particular Pfitzmann and Hansen's consolidated proposal [21] . The epistemic logic approach developed in [12, 19, 26] has recently been extended by Goriac [11] , where a wider spectrum of privacyrelated properties including undetectability, unobservability, and pseudonymity are formulated and discussed. 
A system is a set of runs. The set of all points in a system R is denoted by P(R).
In a multiagent system, we can define the knowledge of an agent on the basis of the indistinguishability of the state for the agent. Given a system R and an agent i, let K i(r, m) be the set of points in P(R) that i thinks are possible at (r, m); that is,
where (r , m ) ∼i (r, m) means that r i (m ) = ri(m). We can say that an agent i "knows" φ at a point (r, m) if φ is true at all points in K i(r, m).
The formulas of epistemic logic are inductively constructed from a set Φ of primitive propositions (such as "the key is k" or "an agent i sent a message m to an agent j"), the usual logical connectives, and an epistemic operator K i that represents the knowledge of agent i. The meaning of each formula can be determined when each primitive proposition is given an interpretation. An interpreted system I consists of a pair (R, π) comprising a system R and an interpretation π that maps each point to the truthvalue assignment function for Φ for the point. In other words, (π(r, m))(p) ∈ {true, false} for each p ∈ Φ and (r, m) ∈ P(R). Given an interpreted system I = (R, π) and a point (r, m) in R, we define what it means for a formula φ to be true at (r, m) in I by induction on the structure of formulas. Typical cases are as follows:
In addition to K iφ, which means that i knows φ, we also use P iφ as an abbreviation of ¬Ki¬φ, which means that i thinks that φ is possible. We also write I |= φ if (I, r, m) |= φ holds for every point (r, m) in I.
In the rest of the paper, we consider that the set A of actions is also associated with each system. We assume that i, i , j, j , . . . range over agents while a, a , b, b , . . . range over actions. Following [12] , we use a primitive proposition of the form θ(i, a), which denotes that "an agent i has performed an action a, or will perform a in the future." Note that the truth value of θ(i, a) depends on the run, but not on the time; that is, if (I, r, m) |= θ(i, a) holds for some m, then (I, r, m ) |= θ(i, a) also holds for every m .
Below we review the formal definitions of anonymity, privacy, onymity, and identity in terms of epistemic logic for multiagent systems. For full details, see [12, 19, 26] .
Anonymity
We say that an action a performed by an agent i is anonymous up to an anonymity set I A ⊆ I with respect to an agent j in the interpreted system a) ] holds. Intuitively, anonymity up to IA means that, from j's viewpoint, a could have been performed by anybody in I A. A typical example of anonymity of this form is sender anonymity, which is explained in Sect. 1.
We also say that an action a performed by an agent i is minimally anonymous with respect to an agent j in the interpreted system
Intuitively, minimal anonymity means that, from j's viewpoint, a could not have been performed by i. Consider that our built-in proposition θ(i, a) expresses a specific form of "link" between an agent i and an action a. Then, we can observe that minimal anonymity is very close to a specific form of the "unlinkability" property that was stipulated by Pfitzmann and Hansen [21] . This observation was elaborated in [26] .
Privacy
Privacy properties can be obtained from anonymity properties by applying the operation of taking the agent/action reversal dual, that is, the operation that replaces a set of agents with a set of actions. For example, we say that an agent i performing an action a is private up to a privacy set A I ⊆ A with respect to an agent j in the interpreted system
Intuitively, privacy up to A I means that, from j's viewpoint, i could have performed any action in A I . A typical example is message privacy, which is explained in Sect. 1.
We also say that an agent i performing an action a is minimally private with respect to an agent j in the interpreted system
Note that minimal privacy is equivalent to its dual, that is, minimal anonymity.
Role Interchangeability
Role interchangeability means that, as far as an agent j is concerned, two agents i and i could interchange their roles, that is, the actions they performed. Specifically, a pair (i, a) comprising an agent i and an action a is role interchangeable with respect to an agent j in the interpreted system
Despite the similarity between role interchangeability and anonymity/privacy, they are not equiexpressive. We can prove that role interchangeability implies both anonymity and privacy under some appropriate conditions [19] .
Onymity
By the "contrary" of a formula of the form θ(i, a) ⇒ Γ, we mean the formula θ(i, a) ⇒ ¬Γ. By taking the contrary of the formulas defining anonymity, we can obtain definitions of onymity. We only show below the contrary of minimal anonymity. We say that an action a performed by an agent i is maximally onymous with respect to an agent j in the interpreted system
holds. Intuitively, maximal onymity means that j knows that i has performed a. This definition corresponds to our observation that onymity generally means that the agent who performs the action is disclosed. We can see that onymity is closely related to personal authentication.
Identity
Identity properties, which are closely related to attribute authentication, can be obtained as the contrary of privacy properties or as the dual of onymity properties. Below we only show the contrary of minimal privacy. We say that an agent i performing an action a is maximally identified with respect to an agent j in the interpreted system I if
Note that maximal identity is equivalent to its dual, that is, maximal onymity.
The definitions of the properties presented above and their known relationships are summarized in Fig. 2 . For example, role interchangeability implies anonymity up to I A, which also implies minimal anonymity. Note that every implication
Figure 2: Formal definitions of some privacy-related information-hiding/disclosure properties.
described here is conditional. A more detailed version of this figure can be found in [26] .
SEQUENTIAL COMPOSITIONALITY OF ANONYMITY AND PRIVACY
As a motivating example for discussion of sequential compositionality, consider an abstract model of an anonymous members-only bulletin board system (Fig. 3) . Suppose that the set of agents includes two disjoint subsets I R and IP of real names and pseudonyms, respectively. Each realname agent can register several pseudonyms to use; the correspondence between real names and pseudonyms is expressed by using θ(i, use(k)), which means that a real i can use a pseudonym k. Besides I R and IP , we also introduce the domain C of possible articles. Each real-name agent uses some of its pseudonyms and posts some articles to a bulletin board. We express this as θ(k, post(c)), which means that a pseudonym k posts an article c. When a real-name agent i uses a pseudonym k and k posts an article c, we say that i submits c. This is formulated as
). Two sets {post(c) | c ∈ C} and {submit(c) | c ∈ C} of actions are denoted by A P and AS, respectively.
Although this is initially given as a model of an anonymous bulletin board system, it is quite abstract and can serve as a model for a more general class of systems, provided that it is appropriately modified. For example, if θ(i, use(k)) is interpreted as meaning that a voter i is authorized to use a pseudonym k for voting and θ(k, post(c)) is interpreted as meaning that k casts a ballot c for some candidate, then this will be regarded as a model of a voting system. (Of course, some appropriate assumptions will be required. For example, to guarantee eligibility, we must assume that each voter uses at most one pseudonym and each pseudonym also real names pseudonyms articles casts at most one ballot.) Furthermore, if θ(i, use(k)) is interpreted as meaning that the first mix-server takes an incoming message i and produces an outgoing message k and if θ(k, post(c)) is interpreted as meaning that the second mix-server takes an incoming message k and produces an outgoing message c, then this will be regarded as a model of a chain of two mix-servers. We shall consider several typical cases where different combinations of privacy-related properties are owned by each registration and posting phase (Table 1) . Below we concentrate on some main specific cases (Cases 1 to 5). The other cases are discussed in Appendix A. Intuitively, when registration is anonymous and posting is private (Case 1), the entire system appears to have good anonymity/privacy properties. However, this conjecture is refuted. Indeed, assume that an observer has some presupposed background knowledge that a real-name agent i will never submit an improper article c. Then, even though the observer thinks that any real-name agents including i could have used a pseudonym k and that k could have posted any articles including c, the observer never thinks that i could have submitted c. More formally, the following holds.
Claim 3.1. There is an interpreted system that satisfies the following: (1) 
every action use(k) performed by i is anonymous up to I R with respect to an observer j; (2) every agent k performing post(c) is private up to A P with respect to j; (3) some action submit(c) performed by i is not anonymous up to I R; (4) some agent i performing submit(c) is not private up to
Consider an interpreted system consisting of two runs r 1 and r2. In r1, the following are true:
In r 2, the following are true:
, and θ(k1, post(c2)). We also assume that the two runs are indistinguishable from the observer j's viewpoint, that is, more precisely, (r 1, m) ∼j (r2, m) holds for each m. Then, it is immediately seen that (1) and (2) hold. Furthermore, (3) and (4) also hold because θ(i 1, submit(c2)) is neither true in r1 nor true in r2 and because θ(i 2, submit(c1)) is neither true in r1 nor true in r2. In other words, the observer can have "presupposed background knowledge" that i 1 never submits c2, and i2 never submits c 1.
Remark 1.
The observations above, in particular, the construction of {r 1, r2} shown in the proof of Claim 3.1, can On the basis of the above discussion, we introduce "independence" assumptions so that anonymity/privacy in the entire system can be obtained quite directly from anonymity/privacy in the registration/posting phases. The registration and posting phases in an anonymous bulletin board system I are independent with respect to an observer j if
holds for every i, k, k , and c. This is analogous to the independence of two events in probability theory: two events A and B are independent if Pr(A)Pr(B) = Pr(A ∩ B). The independence assumption can be regarded as meaning that the observer has no specific "presupposed background knowledge." Example 1. In the system {r 1, r2} shown in the proof of Claim 3.1, the registration and posting phases are not independent. To guarantee independence, we can extend the system so that it has four indistinguishable runs {r 1, r2, r3, r4} (Fig. 4) . In r3, the following are true: post(c1) ). In r4, the following are true: θ(i1, use(k2)), θ(k 2, post(c2)), θ(i2, use(k1)), and θ(k1, post(c1)). Alternatively, we can also obtain a system {r 1, r2, r5, r6, r7, r8} of indistinguishable runs that has the independence property. Similarly, a system {r 1, r2, r9, r10, r11, r12} of indistinguishable runs also has the independence property.
We also discuss, in Appendix C, that independence could be viewed by itself as a "meta-level" abstraction of anonymity or privacy.
The following two lemmas are "dual" and show some obvious sufficient conditions for independence. Hereafter, the {r1, r2, r3, r4}, {r1, r2, r5, r6, r7, r8} , and {r 1, r2, r9, r10, r11, r12} of runs satisfy the independence property.
proofs of the "dual" of proved lemmas or claims are omitted, since they can be straightforwardly obtained from the original proofs via duality.
Lemma 3.1. If every action use(k) performed by i is maximally onymous with respect to an observer j, the registration and posting phases are independent with respect to j.

Proof. Suppose that (I, r, m) |=
P j [θ(i, use(k))] ∧ P j [θ(k , post(c))]. Then, θ(i, use(k)) holds at some point (r , m ) such that (r , m ) ∼j (r, m
), and θ(k , post(c)) also holds at some point (r , m ) such that (r , m ) ∼j (r, m). Since use(k) performed by i is maximally onymous and θ(i, use(k)) holds at (r , m ), θ(i, use(k)) also holds at (r , m ). In other words, (I, r , m ) |= θ(i, use(k)) ∧ θ(k , post(c)) holds. Thus, we have proved that (I, r, m) |=
P j [θ(i, use(k)) ∧ θ(k , post(c))].
Lemma 3.2. If every agent k performing post(c) is maximally identified with respect to an observer j, the registration and posting phases are independent with respect to j.
Case 2 in Table 1 indicates that if the posting phase guarantees privacy, then so does the entire system, provided that the posting and registration phases are independent. Case 3 in Table 1 is a "dual" of Case 2. It means that if the registration phase guarantees anonymity, then so does the entire system, provided that the posting and registration phases are independent.
Claim 3.2. Assume that the registration and posting phases are independent with respect to an observer j. Also suppose that every agent k performing post(c) is private up to A P with respect to j. Then, every agent i performing submit(c) is private up to A S .
Proof. Suppose that (I, r, m) |= θ(i, submit(c)). Then, there exists some k in IP such that (I, r, m) |= θ(i, use(k)) ∧ θ(k, post(c)). From (I, r, m) |= θ(i, use(k)), it is immediate to see that (I, r, m) |=
Claim 3.3. Assume that the registration and posting phases are independent with respect to an observer j. Also suppose that every action use(k) performed by i is anonymous up to I R with respect to j. Then, every action submit(c) performed by i is anonymous up to I R.
In the view of Lemma 3.1, Case 4 can be regarded as a special case of Case 2. More specifically, the following claim directly follows from Lemma 3.1 and Claim 3.2. It indicates that if the posting phase guarantees privacy, then so does the entire system, even though each registered pseudonym is linked to the corresponding real name.
Claim 3.4. Suppose that every action use(k) performed by i is maximally onymous with respect to an observer j.
Also suppose that every agent k performing post(c) is private up to A P with respect to j. Then, every agent i performing submit(c) is private up to A S .
Case 5 is a "dual" of Case 4. It can also be regarded, in the view of Lemma 3.2, as a special case of Case 3. It means that if the registration phase guarantees anonymity, then so does the entire system, even though each article is linked to the pseudonym who posted it. Example 2. Consider the following situation. A special prosecution team has pursued their probe into the hideout of a radical and has found out a time bomb c that seems to have been provided by a sympathizer i. The urgent mission of the team is to determine i performing an action give(c). The essential parts of the bomb c are a timer and gunpowder. The sympathizer seems to have bought the timer and have synthesized the gunpowder, thereby producing the time bomb. Thus, the following definition is obtained: θ(i, give(c)) ⇔ θ(i, buy timer (c))∧θ(i, synthesize gunpowder (c)). A concern here is how some (an)onymity property of give(c) can be deduced from the (an)onymity properties of buy timer (c) and synthesize gunpowder (c). Table 2 shows some cases where different combinations of privacy-related properties are owned by act a and act b . As for the case of sequential composition, the parallel compositionality of anonymity or privacy does not generally hold without some appropriate forms of independence assumptions. We say that act a and act b are independent with respect to an observer j in a system Example 3. Consider the situation described in Example 2. Claim 4.2 indicates that give(c) can be onymous even though both buy timer (c) and synthesize gunpowder (c) are anonymous. This can happen when buy timer and synthesize gunpowder are not independent, that is, when some suspect is considered to be unable to perform both actions for some reason.
Claim 3.5. Suppose that every action use(k) performed by i is anonymous up to I R with respect to an observer j. Also suppose that every agent k performing post(c) is maximally identified with respect to j. Then, every action submit(c) performed by i is anonymous up to I R.
PARALLEL COMPOSITIONALITY OF ANONYMITY AND PRIVACY
I if I |= P j [θ(i, acta(c))]∧ P j [θ(i, act b (c))] ⇒ Pj[θ(i, acta(c)) ∧ θ(i, act b (c))]
Proof. Suppose that (I, r, m) |= θ(i, actp(c)). Then, (I, r, m) |= θ(i, act a(c)) ∧ θ(i, act b (c)) holds. By the assumption of privacy, we have (I, r, m) |=
P j [θ(i, acta(c ))] ∧ P j [θ(i,
CONCLUSION
Building on an epistemic-logic formalism, we have discussed the compositionality of several privacy-related information-hiding/disclosure properties. We have pointed out that anonymity and privacy are not necessarily sequentially compositional and have indicated that the independence assumptions can guarantee the compositionality. We have also developed a series of theoretical case studies on the conditions that are sufficient to guarantee the sequential compositionality of various degrees of anonymity, privacy, onymity, and/or identity. Similar compositionality results have also been shown for parallel composition. Future work will include a discussion of compositionality in terms of the probabilistic extension [12] of epistemic logic. To substantiate the practical value of our approach, a detailed analysis of real world examples should be carried out.
APPENDIX A. SEQUENTIAL COMPOSITIONALITY: MORE CASES
In this appendix, we discuss Cases 6 to 12 shown in Table 1.
We first introduce some additional conditions regarding our motivating example of an anonymous members-only bulletin board system. We say that an action post(c) is exclusive if post(c) is performed by at most one pseudonym in each run, that is, I |= (c) )] holds. For example, if we consider that each article c is labeled and identified with an article ID number, we will accordingly assume that each post(c) is exclusive. We also say that an action use(k) is exclusive if use(k) is performed by at most one real-name agent in each run. For example, if we want to avoid the use of bogus pseudonyms, we will assume that each use(k) is exclusive. Similarly, we say that a real-name agent i is exclusive if i performs at most one use(k) action in each run, that is, I |=
We also say that a pseudonym k is exclusive if k performs at most one post(c) action in each run.
We also say that the posting phase is exhaustive provided that every article c ∈ C has been posted by some pseudonyms. This is formulated as (c) ). Similarly, we say that the registration phase is exhaustive provided that every real-name agent i ∈ I R uses some pseudonyms. This is formulated as
. We also extend the independence assumption so as to deal with Cases 6 to 11. First, the independence assumption can immediately be extended to a disjunctive form.
Lemma A.1. If the registration and posting phases in I are independent with respect to an observer j, then the following holds for arbitrary i p, kp, k q , and cq: Further, the independence assumption can be extended to "positive-negative" and "negative-positive" forms. θ(k q , post(c)) . Hence, the lemma immediately follows from Lemma A.1.
Lemma A.3. Assume that the registration and posting phases in I are independent with respect to an observer j. Also assume that the registration phase is exhaustive and that every real-name agent i is exclusive. Then, I |= (c)) ] holds for every i, k, k , and c.
In some cases, we require a stronger form of the independence assumption to prove compositionality results. Indeed, we need the binarily conjunctive form of the assumption. More specifically, the registration and posting phases in an anonymous bulletin board system I are pairwise independent with respect to an observer j if
holds for every pair (i 0, i1), (k0, k1), (k 0 , k 1 ), and (c0, c1).
Example 4.
In the system {r1, r2, r3, r4} (Fig. 4) , the registration and posting phases are pairwise independent. On the other hand, in the system {r 1, r2, r5, r6, r7, r8} or {r 1, r2, r9, r10, r11, r12}, the registration and posting phases are not pairwise independent.
Cases 2 and 3 can be extended to show the sequential compositionality of role interchangeability. To obtain these results, we require the pairwise independence assumption. 
So, by virtue of the pairwise independence assumption, (I, r, m)
]. This concludes the proof. system {r 1, r2, r5, r6, r7, r8} or  {r 1, r2, r9, r10, r11, r12} (Fig. 4) , every pair comprising an agent k and an action post(c) is role interchangeable as well as every pair comprising an agent i and an action use(k). However, the registration and posting phases are not pairwise independent. Consequently, in these systems, there exist some pairs comprising an agent i and an action submit(c) such that they are not role interchangeable.
Cases 8, 9, 10, and 11 in Table 1 are respectively derived from Cases 2, 3, 4, and 5 by replacing "up-to" anonymity/privacy properties with minimal anonymity/privacy properties. There are two problems in obtaining these derivations. First, consider Case 8 and its dual, Case 9, which are derived from Cases 2 and 3, respectively. Since the definition of minimal privacy/anonymity involves negative formulas, independence assumptions in positive-negative and negative-positive forms are helpful in these cases. Thus, we will use Lemmas A.2 and A.3 in Cases 8 and 9, respectively. Second, consider Case 10 (which is derived from Case 4) and an intended example system consisting of the two indistinguishable runs r 5 and r6 (Fig. 4) . In r5, i1 uses k1 and k2 to post c1 and c2, respectively. In r6, i1 uses k1 and k2 to post c 2 and c1, respectively. Thus, in the system {r5, r6}, every use(k) performed by i is maximally onymous and every k performing post(c) is minimally private, but i performing submit(c) is never minimally private. This is because although the posting actions performed by the pseudonyms k 1 and k2 of i1 are totally different, the submission actions performed by i 1 are defined using existential quantification over k and thus both θ(i 1, submit(c1)) and θ(i1, submit(c2)) hold in both r 5 and r6. To avoid this, we assume that every realname agent can be allowed to use at most one pseudonym in each run, that is, each i is exclusive. This assumption will also be used in a generalization of Case 10, that is, Case 8. Note that to deal with Cases 9 and 11, we need a similar assumption that every possible article c can be posted by at most one pseudonym k in each run, that is, every post(c) is exclusive, which is the "dual" of the assumption above. 
B. PARALLEL COMPOSITIONALITY: MORE CASES
In this appendix, we discuss Cases III to V shown in Table 1.
Cases III and IV are perfectly symmetric and deal with the parallel compositionality of minimal anonymity/privacy. Note that the independence assumption is unnecessary here. Case V in Table 2 indicates a trivial result on the parallel compositionality of linkability. 
C. INDEPENDENCE-AS-ANONYMITY/PRI-VACY INTERPRETATION
In this appendix, we discuss that the independence assumption shown in Sect. 3 could be viewed by itself as a "meta-level" abstraction of the anonymity or privacy property.
We first introduce two additional conditions regarding our anonymous members-only bulletin board system. We say that the bulletin board system satisfies backward causality provided that if k posts c, then there exists some i such that i uses k. This is formulated as I |= θ(k, post(c)) ⇒ W i∈I R θ(i, use(k)). Backward causality can be regarded as a natural assumption in that every posted article should be related by some real-name agent; however, it is not a mandatory assumption because in some cases, certain auxiliary pseudonyms may post some dummy articles to enhance the privacy of real-name agents. We may also assume forward causality, which means that if i uses k, then there exists some c such that k posts c.
It is immediately seen that the definition of independence is equivalent to stating that I |= θ(k , post(c)) ⇒ (k)) and θ(k , post(c) ), then the above equivalent transformation indicates that the independence assumption can be viewed as a certain, abstract form of "anonymity." More specifically, the obtained, equivalent formula means that an "action" coexist(θ(k , post(c)) ) performed by an "agent" θ(i , use(k )) is anonymous up to a certain "anonymity set" with respect to j. Alternatively, if we assume forward causality, the independence assumption can be viewed as an abstract form of "privacy." When we apply our framework to the compositional verification of the anonymity or privacy property of a specific example, it will often be a key task to show that the independence assumption holds. The above remark suggests a possibility that we can use conventional proof methods for anonymity/privacy when showing the independence assumption, although we do not go into detail here.
